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Warfare is enormously destructive, and yet countries regularly initiate armed conflict against one another.
Even more surprisingly, wars are often quite popular with citizens who stand to gain little materially
and may lose much more.   This paper presents a model of warfare as the result of domestic political
calculations.  When incumbents have an edge in fighting wars, they may start wars even if those wars
run counter to their country's interests.  Challengers are particularly likely to urge aggression when
they are unlikely to come into power and when the gains from coming to power are large.  Leaders
who start wars will naturally try to create hatred by emphasizing the threat and despicable character
of the rival country.  Wars will be more common in dictatorships than in democracies both because








I.  Introduction 
 
Why do countries, both democracies and dictatorships, engage in massively self-
destructive wars?  As Mansfield and Snyder (2005) make quite clear, wars are often 
pursued by democracies and are often enthusiastically supported by the population as a 
whole.  Given the enormous amount of destruction caused by armed conflict, it is 
remarkable that countries enthusiastically enter into wars when negotiated settlement is 
presumably always an option (Fearon, 1994).   
This paper follows Marx (1859), Fearon (1994) and Hess and Orphanides (1995) 
and presents a model of warfare where leaders benefit from conflict even though the 
population as a whole looses.
1 Warfare creates domestic political advantages, both for 
insecure incumbents like Napoleon III and for long-shot challengers, like Islamic 
extremists in the Middle East, even though it is costly to the nation as a whole.  Self-
destructive wars can be seen as an agency problem where politicians hurt the nations but 
increase their probability of political success.  This problem becomes more severe if the 
population can be falsely persuaded that another country is a threat.   
The model in this paper considers three different cases.  First, I assume that ability 
at warfare is known only for current leaders.
2  As a result, current leaders with above-
average skills in making war will have an incentive to start wars because, once these wars 
begin, voters won’t want to switch horses in mid-stream for a leader of unproven ability.  
                                                 
1 While the core idea in this paper is in Fearon (1994) and in the work of earlier analysts such as Karl Marx, 
this paper differs from most of its predecessors in providing a political micro-foundation for the electoral 
gains from combat.  Hess and Orphanides (1995) is a prominent exception as it shows war resulting from 
well-described electoral competition.   
2 This is a primary difference between this model and Hess and Orphanides (1995).  In that paper, leaders 
go to war to show their war-making ability. In this model, leaders go to war so that their war-making ability 
becomes relevant to re-election.     3
While the model relies on asymmetric knowledge of incumbents and challengers, any 
assumption that wars increase the costs of switching leaders can generate similar results.  
In this “wag-the-dog” version of the model, leaders will be more likely to support wars 
when their war-making ability is higher, when the war is less costly to the nation, and 
when the benefits of office are higher.  Popular incumbents are less likely to start wars. 
While this version of the model can explain why incumbents might favor warfare, 
it cannot explain why wars would ever be popular. In the second variant of the model, 
war can beneficial because another country poses a future threat.
3  In this model, both 
challengers and incumbents may be too pacific relative to the needs of the nation because 
they bear some costs of war and few future benefits.  There is a strategic complementarity 
between incumbent and challenger decisions about war.  If a challenger is bellicose then 
an incumbent may declare war first to reduce the challenger’s electoral support.      
This second version of the model can’t explain why countries would ever start 
wars that have higher costs than benefits.  To address the existence of extremely popular 
yet costly wars, I allow the possibility that political leaders can send false messages 
incorrectly depicting another country as a threat.  This model follows Glaeser (2005) and 
assumes that people can be misled by political entrepreneurs who vilify outsiders as a 
means of increasing support for their own policies.  Wars become popular because the 
population has been convinced that the outside nation is a threat, but since the people 
have been falsely informed, the wars are ultimately costly to the nation.   
                                                 
3 Wars can serve a country’s interest because countries lack the ability to commit to long run contracts, 
where one country promises never to exploit another in the future.  If one country thinks that the balance of 
favor is increasingly favoring a neighbor then pre-emptive war may be attractive.  Although, in a world 
with complete contracts both nations would happily commit never to start a conflict.     4
In this version of the model, incumbents can again be moved to war by the threat 
of a bellicose incumbent.  Outsiders who are unlikely to come into power otherwise 
support war as a strategy of political desperation.   They may gain politically but are 
unlikely to pay the costs since they are unlikely to be elected.  This result helps us to 
understand why out-groups in countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt are today the 
strongest voices for an incredibly costly conflict with the U.S. and Israel.  This version of 
the model also suggests that information costs are important.  Trust in the government 
also makes war more likely.  Dictatorial control over information may also help 
understand a dictatorial penchant for welfare.     
While there is some debate about the facts (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005), most 
political science work following Bueno-de-Mesquita (1981) finds a robust negative effect 
of democracy on war (Russett and Oneal, 2001, Rousseau, 2005).   This model predicts 
this relationship both because dictators have a greater ability to mislead the public due to 
their control over the media and because the gains from staying in power are much higher 
for a dictator than for a leader in a democracy.   As I discuss in the case studies, there are 
many examples of nineteenth century leaders like Napoleon III and Bismarck who were 
willing to go to war to stay in power, but that there is little evidence of any 20
th century 
American or British incumbents going to war for political purposes.     
The first case study looks at nineteenth century Europe where both Napoleon III 
and Bismarck used wars for domestic political purposes (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005).  
Napoleon III’s foreign adventures rallied support for his wobbly regime and for 
understandable reasons.  Given the unrest he faced in 1870, even the Franco-Prussian war 
doesn’t seem like an irrational gamble.  Bismarck also undertook three wars to create   5
both Prussian hegemony within Germany and to silence the critics of the Hohenzollern 
monarchy within Prussia.  These wars helped ensure Hohenzollern authority in Germany 
until 1918.   
I then turn to entry into World War I—a collectively disastrous act for the 
European powers.  Austro-Hungarian action against Serbia was certainly motivated by 
internal politics, as they were fighting to suppress an ethnic uprising, and to reaffirm the 
primacy of the Hapsburg regime.  German and Russian belligerency also had much to do 
with internal politics.  The Kaiser and his ministers had regularly justified large army 
budgets (which funded a force used to eliminate internal opposition) by emphasizing 
foreign threats from England and Russia.  The Czar similarly tried to build support by 
pushing Russian interests in the Balkans.  In 1914, both Romanovs and Hapsburgs faced 
tremendous internal unrest, and it is unsurprising that both leaders sought popular support 
through a war that could be depicted as defense against outside aggression.   
Finally, I turn to American wars between 1896 and 1975.  During this period, 
there is no solid evidence on incumbents acting in a particularly bellicose way to further 
their own electoral chances.  Entry into World War I and World War II seem to have 
been decisions made out of conviction with little or no political motivation.   Cuba, Korea 
and Vietnam fit a pattern of bellicose outsiders raising the costs for the incumbent.  
Nationalistic outsiders pushed war with Spain in 1898 and McKinley was forced to act 
before he lost control of his own foreign policy.  In 1950, Truman faced a drumbeat of 
Republican hostility to his supposed weakness in Asia.  Likewise, in Vietnam, the 
Johnson tapes show a leader who acted aggressively in part because he feared Republican 
opponents would use any weakness towards Russia against him.        6
The phenomenon of incumbents using war to shore up their power is quite real, but 
the case studies and the model suggest that is primarily a feature of dictatorships rather 
than democracies.  If anything, the tendency in democracies has often been for 
incumbents to be warier of conflict than opposition groups or the public at large.  Both in 
democracies and in dictatorships, the strongest voices for conflict are often outsiders that 
have little chance of having to lead a war torn country, but that stand to gain politically 
by pushing warfare.   
 
II.  Aggressive Wars and Political Survival—Wagging the Dog 
 
This model of warfare hinges on the fact that war can increase popular enthusiasm for a 
leader.  There are abundant examples of leaders who saw their support increase 
dramatically after declaring war (Napoleon III, Czar Nicholas II, Kaiser Wilhelm II and 
Gamal Nasser and even American Presidents).  The popular enthusiasm for war-making 
leaders is hard to understand given the track record that wars have had in causing misery.  
The model explains this enthusiasm with two effects.  First, war makes it costly to switch 
leaders.  Second, people on both sides of a conflict can be enthusiastic about the war 
because of different beliefs about the threats posed by the other nation.   
The first effect—war decreases opposition to the incumbent— stems from the fact 
that internal strife is costly in the face a common enemy.  Cooperation against a common 
enemy is quite rational.  Since opposing the current leader is an extreme form of non-
cooperative behavior, we should expect this behavior to decrease during times of conflict.  
Failure to stand by one’s monarch could easily lead to defeat; after all it was the Duke of   7
Burgundy’s dispute with the King of France that led to Henry V’s conquest of France.
4 
The first variant of the model presents a simple model of warfare where the crucial 
assumption is that changes in leadership are costly in a wartime setting.  The 
complementarity between continuity of leadership and wartime success creates an 
incentive for incumbents to start wars even if those wars are detrimental to their countries 
I assume two countries: the home country and the rival country.  I will only 
concern myself with the events in the home country; the rival country will merely fight 
back in the case of a war.  In this first model, I assume that the rival will not start a war 
itself (this possibility is addressed in the next section).  Within the home country, there is 
an incumbent leader and an opposition.  The incumbent leader and his citizens know his 
quality as a war leader; no one knows the opposition’s quality as a war leader.   
In this first version of the model, the incumbent leader only makes one decision: 
at time one, he decides whether or not to start a war against the rival country.  After the 
incumbent makes this decision, the opposition makes an announcement of his policy 
which can also be war or peace.   This policy is assumed to be binding so that if the 
opposition comes into power, it must carry out its proposed policy.   
After the incumbent and the opposition have both declared their policies, during 
period two, people vote (or in a non-democratic society, decide whether to support the 
incumbent or the opposition).  Votes have exogenous preferences for the two candidates 
and they also make their decisions based on the costs to the country of the war or of 
changing leaders. We do not solve the voter’s paradox, but rather just assume that each 
                                                 
4 There are times when this logic is probably understood by all participants, but the tendency to cooperate 
and support current leaders in the face of a threat also seems emotionally hard-wired   The tendency to band 
together against outsiders has been shown in many experiments, like the famous Smuggler’s Cove 
experiment where boys were given artificial identities and they then fought on the basis of these identities 
(Sherif, 1961).     8
voter has an intrinsic preference, denoted  i η  (which may well be negative) and will vote 
for the incumbent if and only if  i η  is greater than the net war related benefits that would 
be created by switching to the opposition.  Formally, the utility if the incumbent stays in 
power is  ) (Incumbent DA i − η  and the utility if the challenger gets into power is 
) (Challenger DA − , and voters therefore support the incumbent if and only if: 
) ( ) ( Challenger D Incumbent D A A i − > η , where  ) (Incumbent DA  represents the war 
damages if the incumbent stays in office and  ) (Challenger DA  reflects the war damage if 
the challenger takes office.   
In period three after the election, the payoff from the war is realized.  These payoffs 
impact both citizens and the leaders, and people base their votes on the expected payoff 
from the war.  The basic timing of the model is: 
(1) Incumbent decides whether or not to start a war, 
(2) The challenger decides whether or not to have a pro-war policy, 
(3) An election occurs and the winning politician becomes leader, and  
(4) The war is completed and utilities are fought for both the politicians and the 
citizens.   
 
I rule out the possibility that the leader may suffer in some future election for initiating a 
costly war; this is not one stage of a repeated game.   If leaders did have longer time 
horizons, that would deter warfare in this case (but not in later versions of the model). 
The war will create damages to each citizen of country A that are equal to 
p peace I R A B * ) ( − − µ θ ,  where θ  is a constant,  B R  represents the resources of country,   9
A µ  and represents the quality of country A’s leadership, I(peace) is an indicator function 
that takes on a value of one if a challenger who seeks peace is elected and p is a constant 
less than  B R θ .  The leadership parameter is meant to capture the full range of abilities 
that a leader can use to improve his country’s well-being in time of war, including 
strategic sense, diplomatic skills and charisma.  
Implicitly, I have assumed that the quality of leadership in country B equals zero.  
The damage to country B, denoted  B D , equals  p peace I R A A * ) ( − + µ θ . The effect of 
moving towards peace is always to reduce the damage to country B, but country A may 
actually be hurt by moving towards peace if p<0.    The value of  A µ  depends on whether 
the incumbent or challenger is in power.  I assume that a leader’s value of µ  is revealed 
in office but not before, and that the incumbent knew his value of µ  before declaring 
war.  As such, the decision of whether to go to war depends on the realized value of µ , 
which I denote  I µ .  The value of µ  is unknown for the incumbent and the expected 
value of µ  is zero.   
Given these assumptions, if the incumbent doesn’t declare war, then the expected 
net war related advantages from supporting the challenger are zero if the challenger also 
doesn’t declare war and  B R θ −  if the challenger supports war.  If the incumbent declares 
war and the incumbent says he will continue the war, then the net advantage from 
supporting the challenger is  I µ − .  If the incumbent declares war and the challenger opts 
for peace, then the net advantage from supporting the challenger is  I p µ − .   
To close the model, I assume that  i i ε ξ η + =   where  i ε  is an idiosyncratic 
preference distributed symmetrically around zero, and ξ  is common across the   10
population.  The shock ξ  is realized only on the eve of the election only after war related 
decisions have been made and ξ  is distributed uniformly on the interval [] q q 5 . ˆ , 5 . ˆ + − η η .    
The incumbent is kept in power if he receives at least 50 percent of support which 
requires that ξ  plus the war related support from endorsing the incumbent must be 
greater than zero.  I further assume that q is sufficiently large so that both candidates 
always have a chance of being elected.  While this framework is specifically democratic, 
I mean this to also capture the desire of dictators to retain some form of popular support.   
   The politicians choose their actions to maximize expected payoffs.   Being out of 
leadership generates utility of zero.  If a leader is in power during peace, his utility is 
0 0 > B , and if a leads during war, then his utility is  1 0 B B − , where  0 1 > B .  The term  
1 B   reflects the fact that it is less pleasant to be the leader of a war-ravaged nation, and I 
assume that this is paid whether the leader initiated war himself or inherited a country at 
war and is trying to lead towards peace.  The political equilibria are characterized by 
Propositions 1 and 2: 
 
Proposition 1:  If the incumbent declares war, then the challenger will support the war if 
and only if p<0.  If the incumbent doesn’t declare war, then the challenger will never 
support war.   
 
If the incumbent doesn’t declare war, then there is no reason for the challenger to declare 
war since it will be socially costly and unpopular.  If the incumbent does declare war, 
then the challenger is forced to always face the incumbency advantage that his opponent 
enjoys, but he can potentially reduce the costs of war by following a peace policy.  The 
challenger has an incentive to follow the peace policy if and only if p>0 and peace will 
reduce the costs to the country of the war.      11
Proposition 2 characterizes the incumbent’s behavior under the assumption that 
the incumbent believes that the challenger will react rationally to his decision of war vs. 
peace.   As long as  0 > I µ , the incumbent faces a tradeoff when deciding whether or not 
to go to war.  He compares the advantage that comes from increasing his probability of 
staying in power with the disadvantage that comes from leading a country at war.   
 
Proposition 2:  There exists a value of  0 > I µ , denoted 
*
I µ , at which the incumbent is 
indifferent between declaring war and not declaring war. At values of  I µ  above 
*
I µ , then 
incumbent always prefers to declare war and at values of  I µ  below  
*
I µ  the incumbent 
prefers peace.  The value of 
*
I µ  is falling with  0 B , and rising with  1 B , q, η ˆ and and 
rising with p, if p>0.    
 
Proposition 2 emphasizes that warfare which hurts the country is attractive to the 
incumbent if the incumbent has a comparative advantage in defending the country.  Even 
though the country would have been better off if the incumbent had not declared war to 
begin with, voters will continue to support the current leader if the gap between the 
leader’s ability as a war leader is sufficiently large.    
The comparative statics can be interpreted by noting that 
*
I µ   determines the 
range of values of c for which a war will be started, so that factors which increase 
*
I µ , 
narrow that range and make a war less likely.  Increases in  1 B  make war less likely 
because this variable makes the war more painful to the incumbent if he stays in power.   
Increases in p decrease the attractiveness of war (when p>0) because higher values of p 
will make it more likely that the incumbent will lose to an opponent who offers to 
improve the country’s welfare by decreasing the scope of the war.  Increases in q make it 
less likely that declaring war will sway the election.    12
    Increases in  0 B  make war more likely because this variable determines how 
attractive it is to remain a leader of even a war-torn country.  This result can explain why 
wars seem to be more popular in dictatorships than in democracies.  A central feature of 
most democracies is that the ability of the chief executive to expropriate rents for himself 
is limited.  As a result, staying in power in a democracy (especially given the pain of 
being a leader during a costly war) may not be worth all that much.  Staying in power in a 
dictatorship may be worth much more and may be worth the costs of starting a war.   
As η ˆ rises the probability of war falls.  If the leader is going to stay in power 
anyway because he is extremely popular, then he is likely to stay in power anyway and 
the costs of fighting the war become quite appealing.  Since the benefit of wars is 
increasing the probability of staying around and the cost is an unpleasant time as leader, 
those leaders who expect to survive anyway will not engage in warfare.  As in Downs 
and Rocke (1994), war is most politically appealing for the desperate. One interpretation 
of this comparative static is that leaders with a high value of  I µ  but low values of η ˆ are 
good at war, but not otherwise popular (presumably because they are ineffective).  The 
model echoes Hess and Orphanides (1995) in predicting that those leaders who are good 
at war and bad at domestic policy will engage in external aggression.   
 
III.  Appeasement at Munich: Preventative Wars 
 
In this section, warfare creates nothing but costs to the country and is only 
followed by incumbents who seek to use foreign conflict to create an incentive to avoid 
changes of leadership.  Many wars, both in the past and today, have been in favor as   13
much by challengers as by incumbents.  In many cases, like Sparta and Athens at the start 
of the Peloponnesian War or all the great powers at the start of World War I, war is 
people among all combatants.   One explanation of this phenomenon is overconfidence, 
which might be the result of steady political indoctrination where leaders have regularly 
trumpeted the vast power of even the tiniest nation.  The Iraqi reporting on the U.S. 
invasion is a particularly clear example of overoptimistic propaganda.   
A second explanation, which I rely upon here, is that wars are supported because 
of the perceived threat and misbehavior of the enemy.  The population thinks that while 
war may be bad, the alternative is worse.  As such, when Germany invades Belgium or 
Iraq invades Kuwait, war on the part of the British and Americans respectively is justified 
because the enemy has violated a social norm, and this violation distinguishes the enemy 
as a potential threat.  Indeed, no major war has been fought in the past 185 years without 
claims that the enemy is potentially quite dangerous.   
In this second model, I introduce defensive wars by assuming that there is some 
probability that the other country will start a war at some future date.  In this case, after 
the end of the third period in the model above, I assume that there is a final period where 
the rival country may attack the home country.  This period occurs after the leader has 
realized his utility from leading the country, but the citizens expected welfare includes 
the expected losses from this war.  When they consider the pros and cons of war policy in 
the election, they will take into account the impact of this future war.  As such, the timing 
of the model is now: 
(1) Incumbent decides whether or not to start a war, 
(2) The challenger decides whether or not to have a pro-war policy,   14
(3) An election occurs and the winning politician becomes leader, and  
(4) The leaders receive their payoffs 
(5) With some probability, the rival country starts a war against the home country and 
the citizens receive their payoffs.     
 
I assume that the citizens believe that this ultimate war in Period 5 will occur with 
probabilityπ , and that this probability is independent of whether there is a first war.  This 
assumption is surely counter-factual, as a war in period 5 may be more likely following a 
pro-war policy in period (2).  Still the assumption captures the idea of a preventive war 
where the people in one country believe that regardless of their actions, some other 
country will attack them in the future.  The formation of this belief will be addressed in 
the next section, but at this point it is treated as an exogenous.   
The damage done to the home country in this new war equals, which is denoted 
A D′   equals  B R′ θ  where  B R′  denotes the resources of the rival country in this final period.  
These resources equal  () B B B D R g − , or a country level growth rate  B g , times the 
country’s initial resources  B R  minus the damage potentially done to the country in the 
first war  B D .  I assume that in the home country, citizens discount the damage done in 
the fourth period by a discount factor β .     There is a cost from suffering the war today, 
but a benefit because weakening country B will reduce the damage from the next war.   
The expected benefit to citizens from the home country of a preventive war is 
A B B D D g − θ βπ .  The country pays costs today in terms of war damage, but receives 
benefits because by destroying country B, country A ensures that country B will be less 
effective in a future war.   Thus, warfare is more attractive to the citizenry if (1) their   15
country is strong relative to country B, (2) the discount factor is high, (3) they believe 
that the other country will start a war, (4) the elasticity of damage with respect to country 
resources (θ ) is high, and (5) the growth rate of country B is high.  Preventive wars make 
most sense for powerful countries that are in the process of losing their dominance over a 
rival that seems quite likely to start a new war.   
Given these adjusted war related benefits, people will vote taking into account not 
only the impact of the current war on their well-being but also the impact that their 
current war has on the damage in the next war.  The voting rule is now to support the 
incumbent if and only if:  
 
(1)  () ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( Challenger D Incumbent D Challenger D Incumbent D g A A B B B i − > − + θ βπ η  
     
To embed this in the previous model, I assume that nothing else has changed and that the 
leader receive their final payments in period 3 so that they are not impacted by the 
potential fourth period war, except insofar as the possibility of that war changes voting 
behavior.   I do however consider only the case where  0 ≥ p  to focus on the case where 
peace would be attractive to the challenger except for the possibility of preventive war.  
Proposition 3 characterizes the behavior of the opposition:  
 
Proposition 3: If the incumbent does not initiate a war, then the challenger will propose a 
war if and only if  ( )
1 0
1 2 ˆ 5 .
B B
q B




θ θ βπ .  If the incumbent does initiate a war, 
then the challenger will propose to continue the war if and only if  1 > θ βπ B g .   
There exists a value of  I µ , denoted 
*
I µ , at which the incumbent is indifferent 
between declaring war and not declaring war. If I µ  is greater than 
*
I µ , then incumbent 
always prefers to declare war and if  I µ  is less than 
*
I µ  the incumbent prefers peace.     16
 
Proposition 3 describes the two conditions under which the challenger will 
support war.  In both cases, the conditions are that the ratio of the increase in electoral 
support from supporting war divided by a baseline level of electoral support must be 
greater than the change in utility (conditional upon being elected) divided by a baseline 
level of utility.  These formulas follow from the fact that the leader’s utility equals the 
probability of being elected times the utility conditional upon being elected.   
It is possible for a challenger to want to go to war even if the incumbent does not 
go to war but this requires the war to be quite popular.  According to this variant of the 
model, challengers are unlikely to be excessive pro-war, but they can be too pro-peace.  
Challengers will only support wars if they are attractive to the citizenry for war and if the 
gain in votes offsets any natural advantage the incumbent has at war and the utility costs 
from leading a country at war.     
Given the behavior of the challenger, the incumbent then decides whether or not 
to got to war.  Proposition 4 parallels Proposition 2, and again, an incumbent will initiate 
war if he has a sufficient comparative advantage in war.  The appendix details the four 
conditions that determine whether the incumbent will choose to initiate a war.  Because 
these conditions are somewhat arduous algebraically, Proposition 4, I now assume here 
and throughout the rest of the paper that p=0.     
 
Proposition 4:   (a) 
*
I µ  discontinuously falls when the challenger decides to support the 
war (at the point  ( )
1 0
1 2 ˆ 5 .
B B
q B




θ θ βπ ), and at this point the value of 
*
I µ  







.     17
 (b) 
*
I µ  increases with q,  1 B  and  B R  and decreases with β , π ,  B g ,  0 B  and  A R ; 
the impact of these variables is discontinuous where  ()
1 0
1 2 ˆ 5 .
B B
q B




θ θ βπ . The 
value of 
*
I µ  decreases with  θ .     The value of 
*
I µ  increases with η ˆ everywhere except 
where  () ( )
1
2
1 0 5 . ˆ
B
R R g B B
q
B A B θ θ βπ
η
− −
− =  where 
*
I µ  discontinuously falls with η ˆ.    
  
Part (a) of Proposition 4 describes the impact of the challenger’s behavior on the 
incumbent’s behavior.  If parameters are such that the challenger will declare war if the 
incumbent doesn’t, this will push the incumbent towards being more bellicose.   In this 
version of the model, the challenger only supports the war when the citizens also want the 
war, so the challenger’s bellicosity is not suboptimal from the citizen’s point of view, but 
it increases the costs to the incumbent of remaining at peace. There is a strategic 
complementarity across the candidates in their decisions about warfare.    
For parameters values where war is on the margin of optimality for the challenger, 
the incumbent may declare war even if he has a comparative disadvantage at warfare.  
Even though the incumbent is bad at warfare, because the challenger will benefit from the 
war in the election if the incumbent doesn’t move first, the incumbent has a strong 
incentive to start a war.  This situation is most likely to come about when the incumbent 
is inherently unpopular.   
The comparative statics in part (b) combine two effects.  First, there is the impact 
on the returns to the incumbent from declaring war.  Second there is the impact on the 
challenger’s behavior.  If the incumbent knows that the challenger will become warlike, 
even if he isn’t, then this will increase the incentives for the incumbent to declare war 
himself.   In most cases, parameters that increase the returns to the incumbent from 
declaring war will also increase the returns to the challenger from declaring war.  In this   18
case, these parameters have a monotonic impact on warfare, but one that is discontinuous 
at the point where the challenger decides to war.    
For example, as prevention becomes more valued by the electorate (which will be 
the result of increases in β , π   B g , and  A R  and decreases in  B R ), then war is more 
likely because of both effects.  As the country becomes more patient, preventive wars 
become more appealing.  As the country believes that war in the future with country B is 
more likely, then preventive wars become more likely and as the growth rate of country B 
increases then war becomes more appealing.   Finally, as country A’s resources go up or 
country B’s resources go down, then warfare becomes more appealing because 
prevention comes on the cheap.    These comparative statics relates to a political science 
literature that associates the start of war with changes in the relative power of nations 
(Organski and Kugler, 1980, Gilpin, 1981, Levy, 1987)  
The two preference parameters  0 B  and  1 B   have the expected signs.  As the 
innate returns to leadership rise, both incumbents and challengers want to stay in power 
more, which makes war more likely since the fundamental advantage of warfare to the 
leaders are to increase electoral support.  Increases in  1 B  deter both challengers and 
incumbents from pursuing war because this increases the utility costs of leading a war-
torn notion.   Increases in θ  both raise the damage that country A will suffer in the first 
war, but also increase the damage in the second war and the expected benefits from a 
preventive war.  At the margin of going to war, the second effect dominates.  
Finally, the comparative static on η ˆ is non-monotonic.  Almost everywhere, a 
more popular incumbent is less likely to engage in warfare because he expects to be in 
power with a higher probability and doesn’t want to pay the personal costs of leading a   19
war.  The countervailing force is that increases in η ˆ also make it more likely that the 
challenger will declare war if the incumbent doesn’t.  If the incumbent is entrenched, then 
the challenger is unlikely to end up being a war leader (since he is unlikely to win) and it 
makes sense to trade off a greater probability of success in the election with a lower 
utility once elected.  Greater entrenchment of incumbents makes the incumbent less 
willing to risk war because he is going to be elected anyway, but it makes war more 
likely because the challenger is more willing to risk war when he has a low probability of 
being elected otherwise.     
 
IV.  The Formation of Hatred 
 
In the previous model, challengers might be bellicose, but they only support wars when 
those wars are actually beneficial to the citizenry.  This result seems hard to square with 
the bellicosity in many countries when external threats seem objectively small.  Kaiser 
Wilhelm and Hitler and much of the German public saw their wars as justifiable acts of 
German self-defense.  In 1898, Americans argued that Spain was not only evil, but also a 
threat to American liberties in the Western Hemisphere.   These beliefs are not random.  
Governments have often gone to great length to depict the atrocities and threats posed by 
their opponents and these seem generally to have been successful, even when false.  To 
capture this phenomenon, the model follows Glaeser (2005) and allows politicians to 
send misleading signals about the extent of an external threat from external enemies.  I 
refer to this belief in an external threat as hatred for reasons outlined in my prior work.  .     20
 To allow the spreading of hatred, I assume at the start of the model, citizens in 
the home country believe that people in the rival country will start a war-prone with 
probability  0 π , and with this probability they will start a war probability one.  With 
probability  0 1 π −  the rival country will not start a war.  If the rival is war-prone, with 
probability one, the citizens of the home country will receive a signal indicating the 
warlike nature of the rival country.  In the absence of any false signals the citizens will 
accurately assess the risk from the rival country.    
To allow the spreading of hatred against the rival country, I allow either one of 
the politicians to disseminate a false signal that the rival country is in fact a threat.  They 
choose to spread these stories at the same time that they make their policy decisions and 
everything else in the structure of this model follows the subsection directly above.  The 
cost of spreading this story is  I k  for the incumbent and  C k  for the challenger.  The 
incumbent makes this decision when he decides his policy, and before the challenger 
decides his policy.  The challenger decides whether to spread the story after he has 
decided his policy and after the incumbent has decided his policy.  I assume that once the 
incumbent has spread the story, the challenger can neither attack the story nor spread 
additional confirming rumors.  The citizens of the home country believe that with 
probability φ , the story that has been spread about the rival country is false.  In Glaeser 
(2005), I determined an equivalent φ  parameter endogenously so that individual’s beliefs 
were always completely rational.  Here I will treat φ  as an exogenous parameter 
reflecting general distrust in society.     21
The citizens of the home country therefore believe that the rival country will start 
a later war with probability 





 .  If country B is in fact war-prone, then the 
model is exactly the same as that discussed immediately above with 
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I assume that country B is inherently peaceful and focus on the waging war against an 
inherently peaceful country.  In this case, warfare against country B is unproductive to 
the citizens of country A, although they will believe that it is productive.   
   As I assume that p=0, the only policy choice by the challenger is whether to 
declare war if the incumbent doesn’t.   The challenger also needs to decide whether or not 
to spread signals of the war-like nature of the rival country, if the incumbent hasn’t 
already sent such a signal, and this decision is made simultaneously to the decision about 
policy.   First, I turn to the decision to spread false stories: 
 













.  The challenger will always send false stories when he is 
initiating a war.  When  0 < I µ ,  C k  is small,  B R  is large, θ  ≈  A B R R / , and  1 > B g βπ , the 
challenger will spread false stories after the incumbent has declared war without 
spreading false stories. 
 
Proposition 5 emphasizes that hatred in this case, as in Glaeser (2005) appears when it is 
a complement to political policies.  Neither politician spreads stories about the rival 
country unless they are going to war.  The challenger won’t go to war unless he spreads 












 just describes 
whether the benefits of spreading hatred to an incumbent outweighs those costs.  This   22
condition may imply that spreading hatred is more common in dictatorial regimes where 
the government has control over the media.    
It is harder, presumably, for leaders in a democracy to falsely portray an external 
threat.  Still, there are also forces that continue to make this feasible.  First, the 
government, through its intelligence agencies, may be seen as having particular 
knowledge about the threat posed by outsiders.  Second, once there is a widespread belief 
in the danger of an external threat, the media may fear looking either foolish or 
unpatriotic by challenging this threat.
5  Proposition 6 describes the challenger’s 
willingness to spread hatred and endorse warfare:   
 
Proposition 6:  If the incumbent declares peace and does not send a signal, then there 
exists a value of  C k , denoted 
*
C k , at which the challenger is indifferent between sending 
and signal and supporting war and not sending a signal and not supporting war.  If  C k  is 
less than 
*
C k , then the challenger both sends a signal and supports war, and if  C k  is 
greater than 
*
C k , then the incumbent neither sends a signal nor supports war.  The value 
of  
*
C k  is falling with q,  1 B ,  B R and φ , rising with β ,  0 π  ,  B g ,  A R , η ˆ and  0 B . 
 
 The challenger will be more prone to be pro-war when he has the ability to 
spread stories about the threat posed by the rival country.  The value of 
*
C k  captures the 
range of propaganda costs which would lead to warfare where higher values suggest that 
the war-prone opposition is more likely to occur.   The comparative statics tell us that a 
peaceful incumbent is more likely to face a bellicose opponent when trust is high (φ  is 
low), because in that case the opponent will find it easier to convince the population that 
the other country is a threat.  A bellicose opposition is more likely when the returns to 
                                                 
5 Both Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) provide models of media bias 
where the media may be unwilling to challenge widely held views.     23
office ( 0 B ) are higher and when the costs of being a wartime leader ( 1 B ) are lower.   The 
challenger is also more likely to support war when his home country is strong relative to 
the opponent, when the population cares about the future more, when the other country is 
growing more quickly or when wars are more destructive.   
As in the previous version of the model, incumbent entrenchment makes it more 
appealing for a challenger to endorse warfare.  This effect makes it particularly likely that 
challengers in non-democratic regimes will be warlike.  In those cases, the returns to 
leadership are huge, and outsiders have intrinsically a small chance of being elected.   
 Proposition 7 describes a sufficient condition for the incumbent to wage war.  
The full set of conditions under which an incumbent finds war optimal is described in the 
appendix.   
 
Proposition 7: The incumbent will always prefer to declare war if  I µ  is greater than 
*
I µ , 
where 
*
I µ  decreases with β ,  0 π ,  B g , and  0 B  and increases with q,  1 B , and φ .     
  
The basic comparative statics are the same as in Proposition 4 above and for the same 
reasons.  One new comparative static on φ  concerns the level of trust.  A sufficiently 
trusting population is more likely to be lied to and more likely to be taken to war.      
In this case, the incumbent is more likely to go to war if parameters are such that the 
challenger will push war even if that incumbent doesn’t.  Indeed, the incumbent won’t 
declare war unless he has a comparative advantage at warfare or if he believes that the 
challengers will declare war if he doesn’t.  This feature of the model, a peaceful 
incumbent pushed to war by bellicose challengers, will turn out to be a regular feature of 
the case studies that follow.     24
 
V.  Napoleon III, Bismarck and the Wag-the-Dog Strategy 
 
In 1848, both France and Germany had revolutions that appeared to augur a new era of 
democracy and limits on executive power.  But in the decades that followed, both nations 
got empires before they got republics.  In both cases, warfare was an intrinsic element of 
domestic politics.  Both Napoleon III and Bismarck used warfare to further a domestic 
agenda that consisted mainly of executive authority.  I follow Mansfield and Snyder 
(2005) closely in my discussion of Napoleon III, who is particularly interesting because 
he admitted that he used warfare as a means of gaining domestic popularity. 
There are at least four reasons why Napoleon III was particularly prone to 
warfare.  Three of these reasons are captured by the model, and one is not.  First, by 
virtue primarily of his famous name, Napoleon III was understood by the French public 
to have a comparative advantage at military activity (i.e. a high perceived value of  I µ ).  
Louis Napoleon’s hold on power was never all that secure (i.e. he had a low value of η ˆ).  
He had neither the monarchical legitimacy of the Bourbon’s nor the authority of a real 
constitution.  Napoleon III lived in extraordinary luxury as Emperor and might well have 
lost his life if he lost his power (which means he had a high value of  0 B ).     The factors 
behind Napoleon III’s penchant for war, a high value of staying in power ( 0 B ), combined 
with a reputation for military competence ( I µ ) and a high degree of instability (η ˆ) have 
been features of many of the war-prone dictatorship of the 20
th century.   
Napoleon III fought five wars over 22 years.  His first war was a haphazard 
military operation against the Roman Republic.  Louis Napoleon initially abstained from   25
supporting this war, but when he was elected President, he sent troops to fight the 
Republicans. In this war, Louis Napoleon, not yet emperor, tried to steer a middle course, 
but ended up supporting war to gain support from the politically dominant conservatives 
who supported war to protect the Papacy. 
In 1852, Louis Napoleon made himself emperor and he spent the next 18 years 
working hard to keep himself in power.  Napoleon III’s first went to war in Crimea.  This 
war began in a dispute over Catholic rights in Bethlehem and Jerusalem, where Napoleon 
III continued his interest in appearing to be a protector of the faith.  After this dispute led 
to a full war between Turkey and Russia, Napoleon III joined with England in a full scale 
conflict with Russia that would run from 1854 to 1856.   Popular enthusiasm for war was 
stoked by stories of Russian atrocities (the “massacre of Sinope”), and the belief that 
Russia presented a real threat to English interests in the East.   
Karl Marx and others have long argued that Napoleon III fought in Crimea to 
further his domestic political agenda.  Wawro (2000, p. 51) writes that “to marginalize 
this ineradicable opposition [wealthy English-style liberals… red republicans], Napoleon 
III embased on a series of foreign adventures” (Wawro, 2000, p. 51).  A. W. Kinglake, a 
member of Parliament during Napoleon III’s life argued that the Emperor must “distract 
France from thinking of her shame at home, by sending her attention abroad … if Prince 
Louis … were to continue quartered upon France instead of being thrown into prison and 
brought to trial, it was indispensable that Europe must be disturbed” (Kinglake, 1874, p. 
210, cited in Gooch, 1956).          
In 1859, Napoleon III joined forces with Piedmont to fight Austria in Northern 
Italy.  In this case, the Emperor admitted the political advantages of the war, he told his   26
cabinet “On the domestic front, the war will at first awaken great fears; traders and 
speculators of every stripe will shriek, but national sentiment will [banish] this domestic 
fright; the nation will be put to the test once more in a struggle that will stir many a heart, 
recall the memory of heroic times and bring together under the mantle of glory the parties 
that are steadily drifting away from one another day after day” (Plessis, 1985, ppp 146-
147, cited in Mansfield and Snyder, 2005, p. 184).  Emile Ollivier, a republican opponent 
declared, “Italian independence is only a pretext  .. Basically the Emperor is only 
concerned to strengthen his dynasty and silence the slowly emerging internal opposition”  
(Mansfield and Snyder, 2005, p. 188).   
The war started with vilification of the Austrians and popular enthusiasm ensued 
“townsmen and villagers who had ignored the brewing crisis in the winter went berserk in 
the spring, rushing to join crowds and bellowing slogans like’long live war’ and ‘death to 
the Austrians’ when mobilization was annuanced” (Wawro, 200, p. 67).  The Emperor’s 
popularity soared.  One contemporary observer describes how “it is impossible to give 
any idea of the enthusiasm with which [Napoleon III] was greeted when in field uniform, 
with tunic and kepi… An overwhelming acclamation of ‘’Long Live the Emperor!’” 
Case, 1972, p. 75).  France’s mediocre performance in the war was transformed by the 
Emperor’s celebration into another great victory—“the celebrations and illuminations 
after Solferino were even more extensive than those in 1855” (Wawro, 2000, p. 70).     
Napoleon III’s penultimate military adventure was his support for the Emperor 
Maximilian in Mexico.  The official cause of Napoleon’s intervention was the Juarez 
regime’s failure to pay its debts to France, but there is little doubt that he was once again 
seeking any military glory that would strengthen his regime.     27
Napoleon III’s final war was his fight against Prussia in 1870.  French entry into 
this war is typically described as a trap laid by Bismarck.  The precise cause was a 
Hohenzollern candidate for the Spanish throne.  After initially supporting Prince Leopold 
of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, King Wilhelm of Prussia withdrew his support from 
contention but refused to promise the French that there would never be another 
Hohenzollern claim on the Spanish throne.  The German threat was real (after all, 
Germany would invade France three times over the next 70 years), and newspapers allied 
with the government were quite able to depict Germany as a hostile power.  Napoleon III 
declared war and personally led the French troops against Germany.   
Napoleon III again saw that “the war would represent a displacement of internal 
into external politics.”  After public opinion was strongly built against Germany, the 
political gains from war were obvious; the Foreign Minister Gramont declared that “the 
government will not survive in the Chamber tomorrow unless it is able to present definite 
Prussian concessions.”   But why did Napoleon III take this gamble?   
First, Germany was a real and perceived threat which made a “preventive” war 
popular.  Second, Napoleon’s popularity and hold on the government had continued to 
sag throughout the 1860s.  In 1870, the Emperor’s nephew had shot a journalist and “the 
journalist’s funeral on 7 March was the occasion for tumultuous anti-imperial 
demonstrations in Paris.  Barricades went up, buses were overturned and great bonfires 
roared throughout the night” (Wawro, 2000, p. 106).  Without a war, Napoleon III would 
probably have been removed from power and either exiled or imprisoned.  Third, it was 
far from clear that the Prussians would be capable of defeating the French.  The French   28
had better small arms (the Chassepot rifle), and their army had historically been more 
than a match for their German rivals.   
    Of course, Napoleon III came up against Bismarck, who had been skillfully using 
foreign wars for domestic political purposes throughout the 1860s, and Bismarck had, it 
turned out, a far more formidable army at his disposal.  Bismarck became Minister-
President and Foreign Minister of Prussia in 1862 after the Prussian Diet had rejected 
Kaiser Wilhelm’s budget.  His first two years were marked by distinct unpopularity and 
the House of Deputies called for his resignation: “During the Prussian Constitutional 
Conflict of 1862-6, a defeat of the crown did not seem impossible when the Progressive 
Party, representing the liberal bourgeoisie, gained a majority in the Diet and refused to 
approve the military budget” (Bergahn, 1973, p. 11).  Bismarck personally had a low 
probability of survival, and the Hohenzollern monarchy as a whole looked pretty shaky.     
In Bismarck’s first war, Prussia was allied with Austria and the target was 
Denmark.  Before the war, Bismarck “was beginning to see, in the foreign field, 
possibilities of confounding and, eventually, reconciling the parliamentary opposition” 
(Craig, 1955, p.167).  While the conflict was initially unpopular with some, the victory 
strengthened the regime: “Bismarck had long held that, if they were given a foreign 
success sufficiently striking to inflate their self-esteem, the Prussian people would forget 
their internal grievances; and this now proved true” (Craig, 1955, p. 170).   
Bismarck pushed his second war against Austria as a fight for “the establishment 
in Frankfurt of a German Parliament elected by universal suffrage,” because “he believed 
that universal suffrage would have a conservative effect.”  Moltke’s victory over the 
Austrians at Sadowa did change Bismarck’s domestic position enormously, and “within   29
two months of the battle, the Prussian legislature voted budgetary credits to cover the 
government’s expenses during its four-year breach of the constitution” (Mansfield and 
Snyder, 2005, p. 199).    
Bismarck’s 1870 war with France also had political benefits: “throughout North 
Germany swept a flame of impassioned patriotism fed by and reflected in the Press” 
(Howard, 1961, p. 59).  The enthusiasm for the Kaiser, Moltke and Bismarck, grew even 
greater after the stunning defeat of Napoleon III at Sedan.   Unification of Germany under 
Prussian leadership was accomplished in a way that denigrated rather than supported the 
power of popular democracy.  Bismarck’s triumph ensured enough popularity that he was 
able to govern Germany in peace for almost another two decades. Finally, the enormous 
success of Moltke’s general staff ensured that the Diet could no longer try to starve the 
army of resources without courting popular disfavor.  Since the army was the bulwark of 
the ancien regime against popular discontent, funding for the army ensured political 
survival, at least until 1918.   
 
VI.  The European Powers and World War I 
 
In 1914 every major European power chose to engage in an enormously destructive 
conflict that would destroy three ancient regimes (Hohenzollerns, Hapsburgs and 
Romanovs) and lead every incumbent government in those powers to lose control.  Not 
only was World War I a spectacularly bad decision for Europe as a whole, none of the 
leaders in 1914 can possibly be said to have benefited ex post from the decision to go to 
war.   Can the model shed some light on this seemingly irrational conflict?    30
Austro-Hungary was the first nation to start hostilities against a neighbor in 1914, 
and its actions are most clearly dictated by domestic political concerns.  Serbian 
nationalists had shot the Hapsburg heir and “street demonstrations insisted that Belgrade 
be punished and took up the cry Serbien muss sterbien, a play on words that meant 
‘Serbia must die’” (Wawro, 2000, p. 213).   The Serbian killers “had been supplied with 
weapons from a Serbian military arsenal and helped to cross the border by Serbian 
frontier guards,” and this ”information was sufficient to confirm Austria’s rooted belief in 
Serbian malevolence and to arouse its equally ready desire to punish the small kingdom 
for its disturbance of order within the empire” (Keegan, 1998, p. 50).  The incident, 
stoked up by the press, ensured that both Foreign Minister Berchtold and Army Chief of 
Staff von Hotzendorf were eager for war.   
The Emperor Franz Joseph knew that the war would be popular, and if successful 
would both strengthen the regime and discredit ethnic separatists within the Empire.  He 
also correctly feared defeat and change more generally, and he sought support from 
Germany before moving ahead.  Indeed, the remarkable thing about Austrian intervention 
was the reticence of the Emperor given the strong domestic incentives for war. 
The Romanov regime faced considerable internal opposition; there had been a 
revolution in 1905 and the first half of 1914 were marked by widespread strikes.  Russian 
expansion into the Balkans was one means of gaining domestic support; acting as 
protector of the Orthodox Christians in the region was an attractive role for the Czar.  
According to Pipes (1990, p. 200), this foreign entanglement eventually produced the 
need for military action: 
In several previous confrontations in the Balkans, Russia had yielded to 
the outrage of her conservative nationalists.  To have done so again in the 
crisis that developed in July 1914 following the Austrian ultimatum to 
Serbia, worded with deliberate insolence and backed by Germany, could 
have spelled the end of Russia’s influence in the Balkan Peninsula and   31
possibly domestic difficulties.  St. Petersburg, therefore, decided, with 
French concurrence, to support Serbia. 
 
Certainly, the Czar’s domestic troubles quieted immediately after the outbreak of war as 
the nation rallied to his banner.  
The Kaiser’s decision to back Austro-Hungary and then to declare war on Russia 
(after Russian mobilization) was also related to internal politics.   Starting in the 1890s, 
the Kaiser began a costly and belligerent naval arms race that was “nothing less than an 
ambitious plan to stabilize the Prusso-German political system and to paralyze the 
pressure for change” (Bergahn, 1973, p. 29).  The Germans and the English accompanied 
greater naval expenditures with an ongoing program of vilification that emphasized the 
threat posed by the other power.    
Over time, the Kaiser’s and his Chancellor Behtman Hollweg’s domestic position 
weakened and “by the spring of 1911, the temptation to conduct ‘domestic policy with 
the steam power of diplomacy’ had become so great for Bethmann Hollweg and Kiderlen 
that they decided to act” (Berghahn, 1973, pp. 93-94).  The Kaiser then approved sending 
a gunboat, Panther, to challenge the French in Morocco which resulted in an “upsurge of 
imperialist enthusiasm” (Bergah, 1973, p. 94).  After the 1914 Zabern incident, the 
government faced a vote of no confidence from the Reichstag and in early 1914 “the 
majorities in the Reichstag and the reactions of the press showed that large section of the 
population had become alienated from the monarchy” (Bergahn, 1973, p. 178).  In this 
atmosphere, the government encouraged conflict with Russia, because “new enemies had 
to be found all the time … without them … the monarchy as a whole would suffer a 
severe setback” (Bergah, 1973, p. 181).         32
All of the three more dictatorial regimes, Austro-Hungary, Germany and Russia 
had clear internal political reasons for entering into World War I.  The Emperor, the 
Kaiser and the Czar all had strong incentives to stay in power and all of them faced 
declining political support.  The imperial houses all were perceived as having a special 
role leading the country in time of war.  Finally, in all countries, vilification of their 
outsiders (Serbia, England and Austro-Hungary respectively) made the war popular as a 
seemingly necessary piece of pre-emptive defense.   
Entry into the war by the more democratic nations—France and England—seems 
far less driven by internal politics.  Support for war in France reflected both an immediate 
cause—the Franco-Russian alliance—and the long-standing post-1871 hostility towards 
Germany.  When Russia got itself into war with Germany over Serbia, the French stood 
by this commitment, even when it certainly would have been possible to abstain or at 
least council the Russians against war.  Instead, “Messimy, the Minister of War, and 
Joffre, the Chief of Staff, were pressing the Russians to achieve the highest possible state 
of readiness” (Keegan, 1997, p. 61).  Decades of French discussion of the dangers of 
German aggression meant that pacifism was sure to be wildly unpopular, and after all, 
given German actions at the time, French fears were hardly inappropriate.   
 The British entered the war to stand by an 1839 treaty where they pledged the 
neutrality of Belgium, but even this treaty only gave Britain the right, not the duty, to act 
militarily if Belgium was attacked.  Entry into the continental war was chosen by the 
British liberal party, and this entry probably had more to do with the Liberal Foreign 
Minister Sir Edward Grey’s belief in what was right than any political calculation. Still, 
political concerns certainly supported Grey’s (and the Liberal cabinet’s) decision.    33
Decades of anti-German stories and sympathy for “neutral Belgium” encouraged vast 
pro-war public demonstration.  The opposition Conservative party was sure to be more 
hawkish on the issue, and if the liberals failed to act, a pro-war opposition party and 
strong public feelings seemed to ensure that the incumbents would have shortly lost 
power if they hadn’t supported war.   
 
VII.  American Wars 1898-1975 
 
Between 1898 and 2000, the United States has fought six wars with more than 100 battle 
deaths: the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the 
Vietnam War, and the Gulf War.  The Spanish-American war and the Gulf War were 
wildly one-sided wars that involved less than 400 American battle deaths (and less than 
2,500 deaths overall).  The Korean War, the Vietnam War and World War I were quite 
significant, involving 34,000, 47,000 and 53,000 battle deaths respectively.  Finally, 
World War II involved 292,000 battle deaths.
6   
The precipitating event leading to the Spanish-American War was the Cuban 
revolution against Spain led by Jose Marti.  Spain’s harsh suppression of that revolution, 
led by Valeriano Weyler, provided grist for journalists and politicians seeking to vilify 
Spain.  Support for American intervention in Cuba was never led by President.  
Cleveland who was robustly non-interventionist and McKinley who only went to war 
under considerable outside pressure. 
Support for the war came from a set of journalists and Cubans who vilified Spain 
and a set of domestic politicians outside the government who pushed for war.  One set of 
                                                 
6 Battle deaths are from http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/casualty/WCPRINCIPAL.pdf   34
vilifiers were Cuban exiles who started their own newspaper (Patria) and steadily spread 
anti-Spanish, pro-war propaganda: “Aided by skillful propaganda churned out by the 
Cuban Junta in New York and Washington, the insurrection gained wide public 
sympathy, which the administration  could not ignore” (Musicant, 1998, pp. 79-80).
7  
Joseph Pulitzer, William Randolph Hearst and Hearst star reporter Richard Harding 
Davis, aided in the vilification by depicting the insurrection as a just uprising against a 
villainous Spanish regime.  Weyler was described by Hearst’s New York Journal as “a 
fiendish despot … a brute, the devastator … pitiless, cold, an exterminator of men” 
(Musicant, 1998, p. 75).   As Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) write, sharp categorization 
makes better stories than subtle discourse. 
Political support for the war came from Republican outsiders like the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Congressman Joe Cannon and Senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge.  In the wake of the destruction of the American Ship, the Maine, Cannon 
pushed through a $50 million defense appropriation in the “Cannon Emergency Bill” and 
Roosevelt leapt to the forefront of Naval Recruiting.  Enthusiasm for war in Congress 
was so strong that McKinley faced the very real prospect that if he didn’t take action, 
Congress would declare war without his support.  Faced with great popular enthusiasm 
for war, and a profound threat to his authority as President, McKinley finally put an 
ultimatum to Spain to quite Cuba and this ultimatum led to war.  Outsiders saw great 
                                                 
7 Their incentives were obvious.  One member of the “Junta,” Palma, became the first President of 
independent Cuba.    35
gains from belligerency, and just as the model suggests, the incumbent went ahead and 
declare war first.
8      
Outsiders were also more enthusiastic about American intervention in World War 
I that was President Woodrow Wilson. .   Theodore Roosevelt became one of the 
strongest voices for American preparedness and involvement on the allied side.
9  Still, 
between 1914 and 1916, neither Woodrow Wilson nor the Republican leadership firmly 
committed themselves to engagement.  Like the Cuban Junta before them, both English 
and German agents worked to get favorable publicity for their side and build hatred 
against their opponents.  The English proved far more capable than the Germans at 
building hatred, and in the face of changing public opinion and increasing German 
attacks on American shipping, Wilson moved towards preparedness.    
Still, in the election of 1916, Wilson ran as the more pro-peace candidate with the 
slogan “he kept us out of war.”
   The Republican Party was slightly more bellicose, 
declaring that “we must have a coherent continuous policy of national defense, which 
even in these perilous days the Democratic Party has utterly failed to develop, but which 
we promise to give to the country.”
10   The public was not yet convinced that a preventive 
war was necessary, and neither political party was inclined to go against public opinion.    
Wilson’s decision to lead America into war came only in April 1917 after the 
German navy had pursued unrestricted submarine warfare against both allied and U.S. 
shipping for two months.  During this period, the Zimmerman telegram was also 
                                                 
8 Roosevelt would, of course, become President largely because of his role in the war.  Cannon would 
become Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Lodge secured a long career as the foreign policy 
leader of the Senate.     
9  As the model predicts, Theodore Roosevelt was deeply hawkish when he wasn’t in power and didn’t 
need to bear the consequences of his bellicosity, but during his time in office, he was moderate enough to 
even win a Nobel Peace Prize.   
10 Party platform test is from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=R1916.     36
published, exposing a German effort to bring Mexico into war against the U.S.  In the 
face of this German activity, Wilson finally moved.  There is not great evidence that he 
was acting to secure re-election in 1920, nor is it the case that congressional support for 
war was so strong that Wilson had little choice but to go to war.  If anything, Wilson’s 
calculation seems to have been an apolitical, idealistic decision.
11 
World War II seems almost unique among America’s 20
th Century conflicts.  
Franklin Roosevelt was more interventionist than some of his Republican opponents 
(with the notable exception of Wendell Willkie), but his actions prior to Pearl Harbor 
were fairly modest considering the scale of world-wide carnage.  War only came about 
after a direct attack on the U.S., and as such, it is hard to see much of the model at work 
in the decision to go to war against Japan, especially since, even after Pearl Harbor, the 
U.S. did not declare war against Germany.   Intervention into the European war came 
only after Nazi Germany itself declared war on the U.S.   
The wars in Korea and Vietnam harken back to the pattern preceding 1941 where 
the strongest voices for war were outsiders.  Both wars were led by Democrats whose 
opponents were more hostile towards the communist threat.  After a North Korean attack 
on South Korea on June 25, 1950, the next day President Truman authorized General 
MacArthur to evacuate Americans and defend Seoul.  Those orders were later extended 
to attacking any North Korean troops south of the 38
th parallel.  Truman eventually 
committed the U.S. to a full-scale war against both the North Koreans and eventually the 
Chinese to defend South Korea. 
                                                 
11 The only way in which the model is vindicated is the remarkable work of the U.S. government to vilify 
Germans after war was declared.  This was the first war where an explicit agency, the Committee on Public 
Information, worked hard to convince the public of the evil of their wartime opponent.     37
Truman was almost surely motivated by a strong sense of what was right, but he 
did face political incentives to intervene.  Like McKinley in 1898, Truman faced a solid 
group of political opponents who had been attacking him for military weakness towards 
the Soviet Union and specifically for his failure to stop Mao Zedong’s establishment of a 
communist China.in 1949.  After Mao’s victory, Senator Styles Bridges called for a vote 
of censure against the Truman administration and Senator Knowland called for 
Acheson’s resignation (Acheson, 1969, p.358).  Joseph McCarthy made his first assault 
on the administration in Wheeling, West Virginia, on February 9, 1950.  Truman (and 
Acheson’s) Republican opponents consistently called for a more aggressive policy 
against communism, particularly in the Far East. 
A failure to defend South Korea in 1950 would have cost Truman politically.  His 
Republican opponents immediately claimed that Acheson had invited aggression in 
Korea by a failure to affirm the U.S. commitment to Asia.  The American public was 
convinced of a communist threat and many people thought that Truman had already 
shown weakness on this issue.   As in 1898, a strong pro-war group outside of power 
increased the costs of peace for the incumbent.   
The basic pattern of Democratic support for Vietnam mirrored Truman in Korea 
and McKinley in Cuba.  As opposed to Truman, there is clearer evidence that Johnson’s 
actions were motivated partially by a desire to reduce the ability of his Republican 
opponents to argue that he was soft.  He was “especially worried about keeping Lodge 
mollified because Republicans are waging a Lodge-for-President write-in campaign in 
New Hampshire.  He does not wish to give his Ambassador in Saigon a pretext for 
resigning in protest, coming home and running against him for President, complaining to   38
Americans that LBJ is doing too little to save South Vietnam” (Beschloss, 1997, p. 259).  
In the 1964 election against Goldwater, Johnson ran a campaign emphasizing that 
Goldwater was too pro-war, but at the same time, he saw commitment to Vietnam as a 
means of combating the view that he was himself too pro-peace.   
Even in his second term, Johnson was afraid of appearing too weak to stay 
committed to the war in Vietnam or even to win it.  He correctly anticipated that the 
Republicans would run a hawkish candidate in 1968, and that a Democratic failure to win 
the war would be used against the Democratic candidate.
12  His support for the war came 
not from a wag-the-dog attempt to distract from domestic weakness, but rather an attempt 
to pre-empt his domestic opponents from arguing that he wasn’t sufficiently strong on 
national defense.   
This history of American wars between 1896 and 1975 does not show an 
overwhelming pattern of political wars, perhaps because staying President for four more 
years isn’t enough to make up for the terrible costs of war.  If there is a political pattern, 
it is of less bellicose incumbents going to war to pre-empt pro-war opposition groups, 
which is one scenario suggested by the model.  .  
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 
Does this model help us to understand conflict in the Middle East today?  While the logic 
of the wag-the-dog section of the model has been used to explain American intervention 
in Iraq, if the war was meant to increase popularity, then this seems to have been a 
                                                 
12 He did, however, underestimate the extent to which pro-peace forces within his own party would 
eventually upset his goals for second nomination.     39
profound miscalculation.  It is hard to think that the change in the probability of staying 
in power (which in retrospect was probably negative) times the modest benefits of being 
president was even in expectation large enough to justify the difficulties inherent in 
leading the country through an unpopular war.    
The one aspect of the model that is supported by recent events in the U.S. is that 
the supporters of the war, both in and out of the administration, worked hard to vilify 
Saddam Hussein.  The fact that some allegations appear to be incorrect ex post is 
consistent both with the model and with almost every other example of wartime 
leadership.  As Arthur Ponsonby said in 1928, “when war is declared, truth is the first 
casualty.” 
The model does better at explaining the political patterns in the Middle East.  
While previous Middle Eastern leaders, notably Nasser and Saddam Hussein, led their 
countries into wars, quite possibly to quiet domestic discontent, the current leadership of 
Islamic countries has not pushed towards war with Israel. Instead, it has been generally 
allied with the U.S.  Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and has frequently cooperated with 
the U.S. While the leadership of these countries has generally sought to avoid conflict 
(after all, any conflict would be immensely costly to them), dissident groups within these 
countries have been far more bellicose. These groups have worked to demonize the U.S. 
and Israel.  For these political actors, who have little chance of coming into power, 
supporting conflict increases political support and there is little chance of having to 
actually lead the country in war. 
Can the threat posed by these anti-U.S. and anti-Israel Arab leaders be reduced?  
The model suggests three parameters that might be changed and that might matter.  First,   40
decreasing the returns to leading these countries, through checks on the power of the 
executive, should reduce the incentives to use military means to stay in power. Second, a 
greater rotation of leadership, where the current opposition has a higher probability of 
leading in the future, should reduce the attractiveness of promoting highly self-
destructive policies.  Third, policies that increase the costs of spreading hatred against the 
U.S. and Israel, will also make war less popular and war-mongering less attractive.    
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:   In the event that both candidates declare for peace, the 
probability of the incumbent remaining in power is  q / ˆ 5 . η +  and the returns to being 
leader are  0 B  for either leader, so the expected utility for the incumbent is  0 B  times 
q / ˆ 5 . η +  and the expected utility for the challenger is  0 B  times q / ˆ 5 . η − .  If the 
incumbent is pro-peace, but the challenger declares for war, then the probably of the 
incumbent staying in power is  q RB / ) ˆ ( 5 . θ η + +  and the expected utility of the incumbent 
is this probability times 0 B .  The expected probability of victory for the challenger is 
q RB / ) ˆ ( 5 . θ η + −  and the expected utility for the challenger equals  
() () 1 0 / ) ˆ ( 5 . B B q RB − + − θ η .  This implies that the challenger will never declare war.   
because 0 > B R θ . 
 
If the incumbent declares war and the challenger supports the war, then the probability of 
electoral success for the incumbent is  q I / ) ˆ ( 5 . µ η + +  and the expected benefits for the 
challenger are () ( ) () 1 0 / ) ˆ ( 5 . B B q I − + − µ η .  If the incumbent declares war and the 
challenger promises peace, then the probability of electoral success for the incumbent is 
q p I / ) ˆ ( 5 . − + + µ η  and the expected benefits for the challenger 
are() ( ) 1 0 / ) ˆ ( 5 . B B q p I − − + − µ η .  The challenger will support peace if and only if 
0 > p .   
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  The incumbent receives expected utility of ( ) 0 / ˆ 5 . B q η +  if he 
doesn’t declare war.  If p<0 so the challenger will support the war, then the incumbent’s 
payoff from declaring war is () ( ) 1 0 / ) ˆ ( 5 . B B q I − + + µ η .   If p>0, so the challenger will 
support peace, then the incumbent’s payoff from declaring war is 
() ( ) 1 0 / ) ˆ ( 5 . B B q p I − − + + µ η .  The incumbent’s benefits from declaring war are 
therefore () ( ) 1 0 / )) , 0 ( ˆ ( 5 . B B q p Max I − − + + µ η  which is greater than () 0 / ˆ 5 . B q η +  if and 
only if  ()
*
1 0
1 ) , 0 ( ˆ 5 . I I p Max q
B B
B
µ η µ = + +
−
> .  The value of 
*
I µ  is falling with  0 B , and 
rising with  1 B , q, η ˆ and, when p > 0, p.    
 
 Proof of Proposition 3:  If the incumbent doesn’t initiate a war and the challenger also 
declares for peace, then for voters there are no net war related gains from supporting the 
challenger and the probability of the incumbent staying in power is  q / ˆ 5 . η + .  If the 
incumbent doesn’t initiate a war, but the challenger declares for war, then for voters, the 
war related gains in supporting the challenger are  B A B R R g θ θ βπ −
2  and the probability of 
victory for the incumbent will equal  ( ) q R R g B A B / ˆ 5 .
2 θ θ βπ η + − + . As such, the   42
challenger will benefit from initiating a war if and only if  
()
1 0
1 2 ˆ 5 .
B B
q B




θ θ βπ .   
 
If the incumbent does initiate a war, and the challenger also supports the war, then the 
war related gains from supporting the incumbent are  ( ) I B g µ θ βπ 1 + , the incumbent’s 
prowess as a war leader makes him both an advantage in the current war and an 
advantage in the next war.  As such, the probability of incumbent success is 
() () q g I B / ) 1 ˆ ( 5 . µ θ βπ η + + + .  If the incumbent declares war and the challenger supports 
peace, then the war related benefits from supporting the incumbent equal 
() () θ βπ µ θ βπ B I B g p g − − + 1 1  and the probability of incumbent success is 
() () () q g p g B I B / ) 1 1 ˆ ( 5 . θ βπ µ θ βπ η − − + + + .    Putting these together, the challenger will 
support a war begun by an incumbent if and only if: 1 > θ βπ B g .   
 
Conditions for the Incumbent to Support War:  For the incumbent there are four cases to 
consider: (1) the challenger favors war in either state, (2) the challenger favors war in 
neither state, (3) the challenger supports whatever policy favored by the incumbent and 
(4) the challenger is strictly contrarian and supports war if and only if the incumbent 
favors peace.   
 
If the challenger favors war in either state, then the incumbent favors war if and only if 
() () ( ) 1 0 / ) 1 ˆ ( 5 . B B q g I B − + + + µ θ βπ η  is greater than  ( ) ( ) 0
2 / ˆ 5 . B q R R g B A B θ θ βπ η + − +  or  
() ( )













I g B B
R R g B q B
. 
 
If the challenger does exactly what the incumbent does then the challenger favors war if 
and only if  () () ( ) 1 0 / ) 1 ˆ ( 5 . B B q g I B − + + + µ θ βπ η  is greater than ( ) 0 / ˆ 5 . B q η +  or 
()











I g B B
q B
..   
 
If the challenger declares peace in either case, then the challenger favors war if and only 
if  () () () ( ) 1 0 / ) 1 1 ˆ ( 5 . B B q g p g B I B − − − + + + θ βπ µ θ βπ η  is greater than () 0 / ˆ 5 . B q η +  or  
()()
1




















Finally, if the challenger always does the opposite of the incumbent then the challenger 
supports war if and only if  ( ) ( ) () ( ) 1 0 / ) 1 1 ˆ ( 5 . B B q g p g B I B − − − + + + θ βπ µ θ βπ η  is   43
greater than  ( ) ( ) 0
2 / ˆ 5 . B q R R g B A B θ θ βπ η + − +  or 
()() ()
() 1
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In all four of these conditions, there is a cutoff point for  I µ  that determines whether war 
is optimal for the incumbent.   
 
Proof of Proposition 4: If 0 = p  so there effectively is no peace option once the war is 
started then, then the conditions collapse to: (1) the challenger declares war if the 
incumbent doesn’t if and only if  ( )
1 0
1 2 ˆ 5 .
B B
q B




θ θ βπ , (2) if this condition 
holds, then the incumbent declares war if and only if 
() ( )













I g B B
R R g B q B
  and (3) if the challenger’s condition fails to 
hold,  the incumbent declares war if the condition fails to hold if and only if. 
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I µ  drops discontinuously from  ( )
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To derive comparative statics in this case, it is necessary to consider both  
comparative statics holding challenger behavior constant and to then include the effects 
that come when parameters change challenger behavior.   Holding challenger behavior 
constant, the variables, η ˆ, q, and  1 B  cause 
*
I µ  to rise and the variables  0 B , β , π , and 
B g   cause 
*
I µ  to fall within region.  Increases in  A R  cause 
*
I µ  to fall and increases in  B R    44
cause 
*
I µ  to rise, when  ( )
1 0
1 2 ˆ 5 .
B B
q B




θ θ βπ .  Increases in θ  cause 
*
I µ  to fall 
unless  ()
1 0
1 2 ˆ 5 .
B B
q B




θ θ βπ  and   B A B R R g < θ βπ 2 .   
Increases in η ˆ, β , π ,  B g ,  0 B  and  A R  and decreases in  B R , q and   1 B  make the 
condition  ( )
1 0
1 2 ˆ 5 .
B B
q B




θ θ βπ , more likely to hold if this condition holds 
there is a discontinuous drop in 
*
I µ .  Increases in θ  make the condition more likely to 
hold if   B A B R R g > θ βπ 2 , but this must always hold if the condition holds.    As such, 
*
I µ  
is smoothly increasing with q and   1 B  and smoothly decreasing with β , π  and  B g  
almost everywhere, but at the point where  ( )
1 0
1 2 ˆ 5 .
B B
q B




θ θ βπ , 
*
I µ  
discontinuous jumps upward with q and   1 B  and discontinuously jumps downward with 
β , π  and  B g .  Increases in η ˆ cause 
*
I µ  to rise almost everywhere, except at the point 
where  ()
1 0
1 2 ˆ 5 .
B B
q B




θ θ βπ  at which point an increase in η ˆ causes a 
discontinuous jump downward in 
*
I µ .   
 
Proof of Proposition 5:  If the incumbent has not declared war and has not sent a signal, 
then there are four options for the challenger: (1) no war/no signal, (2) no war/signal, (3) 
war/no signal and (4) war/signal.  No war, no signal yields utility of ( ) 0 / ˆ 5 . B q η − .  No 
war and signal yields expected utility of ( ) C k B q − − 0 / ˆ 5 . η , which is clearly dominated by 
no war/no signal.   War/no signal yields utility of  ( ) ( )( ) 1 0 / ˆ 5 . B B q RB − + − θ η , which is 
also clearly dominated by no war/no signal, and finally war/signal yields utility of 
() C B




























β η .    This dominates no war/no signal if 
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   If the incumbent has not declared war, but has sent a signal, then the challenger 
only needs to decide whether or not to declare war, and as before, he will benefit from 
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.   For the incumbent, the no war/no 
signal strategy is always preferable to the no war/signal strategy.  Indeed, 
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, then the challenger will pursue 
no war/no signal in either case, so the incumbent has utility ( ) 0 / ˆ 5 . B q η +  if he chooses no 





























, then the challenger will pursue no 
war/no signal if the incumbent chooses no war/no signal and the challenger will pursue 
war if the incumbent chooses no war/signal.  For the incumbent, the expected utility from 
no war/no signal is () 0 / ˆ 5 . B q η +  and the utility from no war/signal is 
I B

















































by assumption.  Finally, if 
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1 , then the challenger will choose 
war/signal if the incumbent pursues no war/no signal and war if the incumbent pursues no 































β η , and his payoff from no war/signal is 
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β η .  Thus no war/no signal is always preferable 
to no war/signal for the incumbent, and the incumbent will only send a signal if he is 
initiating a war. 













.  If the incumbent declares war without sending a signal, then 
the challenger will benefit from sending a signal if and only if  
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and his utility for war/no signal is ( )( ) 1 0 / ) ˆ ( 5 . B B q I − + + µ η .  War/signal dominates in 












, and this inequality implies that  0 > I µ ,   46
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Now we turn to conditions under which the challenger will send a signal after the 
incumbent has declared war without sending a signal.  As shown, the challenger will send 
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, which insures that war/no signal dominates war/signal for the 
incumbent.  Assuming (*), the incumbent decides between war/no signal and peace/no 
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, then peace/no signal by the incumbent 
induces the challenger to go peace/no signal.  In this case, the utility for peace/no signal 
for the incumbent is () 0 / ˆ 5 . B q η + , while the utility for war/no signal is 
() 1 0
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≡ .  Thus the 
challenger will send a signal after the incumbent has gone war/no signal if and only if (*), 
(**), and (***) hold, which is possible when  0 < I µ ,  C k  is small,  B R  is large, θ  ≈ 
A B R R / , and  1 > B g βπ . 
  
Proof of Proposition 6:     If the incumbent does not declare war, the challenger will if 
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β .  Comparative statics follow 
directly.  
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and comparative statics follow.    50
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